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Federalism vs. States’ Rights: A Defense of
Judicial Review in a Federal System
John McGinnis and Ilya Somin
Abstract
This essay offers a new defense of judicial review of the Constitution’s federal
structure. It begins by showing that federalism is best understood not as a sys-
tem that creates rights for states but one that provides benefits for the citizens of
the nation. It achieves this goal by distributing powers best exercised at the na-
tional level to the federal government and those best exercised more locally to the
states. The benefits of this distribution include catering to diverse preferences of
citizens in different states and creating horizontal competition among the states
for efficient provision of government services. Because these benefits flow to
citizens rather than to government officials, the structure of federalism creates a
classic principal-agent problem. We show in the paper that citizens will be poor
monitors of these officials, because they are rationally ignorant of politics, partic-
ularly structural issues, like federalism, and because they are an extremely large
group, giving them incentives to free ride on the monitoring of others. We then
show that state officials have incentives to take advantage of this lax monitoring
and themselves undermine federalism. State officials may surrender their powers
and acquiesce in congressional overreaching in the areas of the Commerce Clause,
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the spending power and sovereign immu-
nity. To give just one example, we show that while horizontal competition among
the states may benefit citizens, state officials may benefit from avoiding compe-
tition and seeking a cartel sustained by a federal regulation. For such reasons,
the political process cannot be counted upon to protect the proper distribution of
powers, because state officials as well as federal officials have few incentives for
its preservation. Because our theory of federalism is not a states’ rights theory, we
also believe that judicial review is appropriate when states usurp federal power
or otherwise undermine federalism. State officials have strong incentives to un-
dermine structural federalism in such areas as the dormant Commerce Clause and
the Compact Clause. We thus call for more judicial enforcement in some of these
areas as well. Ours is thus a unified theory of judicial review that justifies judicial
enforcement of federalism against both federal and state governments. We end by
sketching the beginnings of a theory explaining why the federal judiciary, given
its structure and incentives, will improve the enforcement of this most essential
constitutional distribution of power.
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Federalism vs. States’ Rights: 
A Defense of Judicial Review in a Federal System 
 
John O. McGinnis* 
Ilya Somin* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Federalism is the cornerstone of the Constitution. Yet, federalism is too often confused by both 
admirers and detractors with state autonomy, popularly known as “states’ rights.” The constitutional 
system of federalism assigns powers to state and federal government officials not for their own benefit, 
but for that of the people of the entire nation.  As we will discuss, the benefits of this distribution of 
power within the federalist structure are many—the satisfaction of diverse preferences and competition 
both among the states and between the states and federal government to satisfy those preferences. While 
state autonomy plays a large role in sustaining the benefits of federalism, the federal government also has 
an important role to play in restricting state autonomy in specific ways so as to keep open the avenues of 
trade and movement among the states.   
In protecting this beneficial distribution of power, the people, to use economic terminology, are 
“principals” and state and federal officials merely their “agents.”1 This allocation of roles between the 
people and their legislators creates the possibility that principal-agent problems will arise in the 
maintenance of federalism when  the interests of elected officials diverge from those of ordinary citizens.  
                                                 
*  Class of 1940 Research Professor, Northwestern Law School, B.A. Harvard, 1979; M.A. Oxford, 1980; J.D. 
Harvard 1983.  
 
Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law; B.A., Amherst College, 1995; J.D., Yale Law 
School, 2001; M.A. Harvard University Department of Government, 1997; Ph.D. expected. Both authors are grateful 
to Steven Calabresi,  Barry Friedman, Nelson Lund, Mark Movsesian,  Max Schanzenbach and Rob Sitkoff for 
thoughtful comments.  
 
1 For helpful reviews of the principal-agent literature, see Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, A Survey of Corporate 
Governance, 52 J. Fin. 737 (1997); Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review, 14 Acad. 
Mgmt. Rev. 57 (1989); Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 777 (1984). 
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The structure of federalism thus must be protected against the machinations of both federal and state 
governments. Often, the interests of the latter conflict with this structure no less than those of the former. 
This essay defends the distributional model of federalism and the princ ipal-agent model for 
analyzing its enforcement, arguing that together they have profound implications for modern federalism 
jurisprudence. Political economy analysis confirms that the political process will not always protect the 
Constitution’s beneficial distribution of power, because the people’s agents--federal officials and state 
officials alike--are primarily motivated by their own political interests. These interests, however, have no 
necessary connection to the maintenance of the distribution of powers set out in the Constitution.   
Officials will thus often use the initial distribution of powers assigned by the Constitution as chips to 
trade or indeed to surrender rather than systematically defend.2  Because of their rational ignorance of 
public policy, citizens are also unlikely to consistently protect federalism, particularly because it is a 
complex issue of governmental structure that lacks political salience compared to the pressing public 
policy issues of the day.  Accordingly, the argument made by some commentators and on occasion the 
Supreme Court that the political process can be relied upon to protect federalism is fundamentally flawed.  
 Thus, the courts should enforce the Constitution’s federalism provisions no less than its 
individua l rights provisions. But the rationale for judicial intervention is not a rationale rooted in 
protecting the rights of the states but in protecting the benefits that flow to citizens from a proper 
distribution of state and federal powers.  Our theory thus shows why it is equally appropriate for the Court 
to protect federalism against interference by the states: federal officials, like state officials, cannot be 
expected to stand up for federalism when such action clashes with their political interests.  Judicial review 
in either case is exercised on behalf of citizens who often lack the incentive to enforce the distribution of 
powers themselves.  
                                                 
2  See John  O. McGinnis,  Constitutional Review by the Executive in Foreign Affairs and War Powers: A 
Consequence of Rational Choice in the Separation of Powers, 56 L. & CONTEMP . PROBS. 293, 295 (1993) (detailing 
that initial distribution of constitutional power is merely a baseline from which political actors make deals). 
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The Rehnquist Court has begun to recognize this rationale for judicial protection of federalism.   
In New York v. United States,3 the Court noted that state legislators may sometimes actually want the 
federal government to dictate to them so that they can blame any resulting unpopular policies on 
Washington. 4  Even when it does not expressly offer this kind of structural rationale, many of the 
Rehnquist Court’s federalism cases have often been consistent with the logic of the theory of federalism 
offered here. Most famously, of course, the Court has required Congress to respect some limitations on its 
Commerce Clause powers, protecting jurisdictional competition and other virtues of decentralizing 
federalism. But, in keeping with our theory, the Rehnquist Court’s jurisprudence is not limited to 
protecting state autonomy. It has sometimes imposed limits on state autonomy when necessary to protect 
structural federalism.  For instance, it has extended Dormant Commerce Clause protections against state 
discrimination to nonprofit institutions,5 thus reinforcing interstate economic competition for non-profits 
as well as commercial firms. The Rehnquist Court has also built on Warren Court precedents enforcing 
the right to travel, a right that protects competitive federalism by preventing states from constricting the 
ability of citizens to move across state lines. Thus, while we will on occasion criticize the Court’s 
federalism jurisprudence, many of its decisions comport with our theory.  
Our essay will generalize the insight of New York v. United States into the principal-agency 
problem of federalism, providing a more comprehensive theory of the ways that the interests of 
government officials, both state and federal, may systematically undercut constitutional federalism.  State 
officials may also sometimes want to discard the state autonomy guaranteed by enumerated powers.  
Similarly, federal officials may not consistently want to exercise their responsibilities under the 
Commerce Clause and the Compact Clause to protect federalism against the depredations of state 
governments.  Thus, we show that a coherent theory of judicial intervention on behalf of state autonomy 
is part of a larger theory that helps explain a wider range of jurisprudence than that usually associated 
                                                 
3 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182-83 (1992). 
 
4New York, 505 U.S. at 181-82. 
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with federalism. The Court must protect the public interest in the constitutional distribution of federal and 
state powers because the goals of state and federal officials are often not congruent with the public 
interest.  And citizens are unlikely to be able to monitor, let alone punish, these officials' disregard of their 
constitutional responsibilities. 
 The theory we outline is primarily a structural one. We do not, however, intend to denigrate the 
importance of text and original meaning to judicial review of federalism.6 Our argument should be viewed 
as a supplement to analyses of text and original meaning rather than a replacement for them. 
 Part I outlines our basic theory.  It shows that Constitutional federalism is a classic example of a 
principal-agent problem.  As in other situations where principals have less information than their agents 
and where the multiplicity of principals reduces their incentives to monitor agents’ activities, citizens are 
unlikely to provide effective oversight of the behavior of public officials, state or federal. These officials 
in turn have incentives to depart from the beneficial distribution of power between the state and 
government officials provided by the Constitution.  The systematic inability of political actors or citizens 
to enforce that distribution fatally undermines the political process theory of federalism enforcement.  
 Part II provides a brie f survey of the major structural advantages of federalism: responsiveness to 
diverse local preferences, horizontal competition between state governments for businesses and residents, 
and vertical competition between the states and the federal government. Throughout this essay, we show 
how judicial intervention in various areas can help promote these goals. 
 Part III applies our theory to the protection of state government power, showing in each case that 
the benefits of federalism may be in systemic conflict with the interests of state officials who thus may be 
only too willing to give up the state authority that leads to these benefits.   For instance, the Commerce 
Clause leads to beneficial interjurisdictional competition, but state officials, like competitors everywhere, 
may prefer a cartel that eliminates or at least reduces competition. States have similar incentives to 
                                                                                                                                                             
5 Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 584 (1997). 
6 For strong arguments that text and original meaning require vigorous judicial review of federalism, see, e.g., 
Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution chs. 7, 11 (2004); Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The 
Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459 (2001). 
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support federal overreaching under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the area of federal 
spending, state officials may welcome federal grants that allow them to augment the state’s budget even 
at the expense of state autonomy.  Provisions that prohibit commandeering may promote accountability in 
government, but states officials may benefit from diminished accountability. Sovereign immunity may 
benefit citizens by permitting each state greater control over their budgets, but state officials may believe 
that their state may benefit from federal imposition of liability because competitor states will suffer more 
costs than will their own states.7 
As this last example shows, state officials may not only disregard the appropriate distribution of 
power for their own personal interests, but for the interests of their states. Nevertheless, such a departure 
from the distribution of power harms the citizens of the nation as a whole.  Recognizing that state 
officials’ exercise of state powers for the benefit of citizens in their own states can undermine federalism 
underscores that ours is, paradoxically, a nationalist theory of federalism– a theory of federalism designed 
to benefit all the nations’ citizens, rather than a state s’ rights theory.  
 Part IV demonstrates that our theory is part of a broader theory of protecting the constitutional 
distribution of governmental authority, both state and federal. We show that just as state officials will 
often fail to protect the authority that is appropriately theirs, federal officials will often have no interest in 
restricting the abuse of state government power in ways detrimental to federalism. For instance, citizens 
throughout the nation benefit from preventing states from interfering with interstate commerce. Yet 
federal officials who depend for reelection on parochial constituencies and interest groups may often be 
unwilling to take the initiative to protect the free flow of interstate commerce against state-level 
protectionist interests. Hence the Court has properly intervened to enforce the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, requiring federal legislators to affirmatively permit states to block interstate commerce.   We also 
show that our theory calls for the judiciary to enforce a right to travel and a limitation on one state’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
7 As we discuss below, however, we have some reservations about whether sovereign immu nity actually advances 
the values of federalism we describe in Part II. But if it does advance these values, our principal-agent theory offers 
a justification for judicial enforcement.  
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imposition of punitive damages based on actions within another state. Further, we contend that the Court 
should apply this theory more vigorously to protect constitutional federalism against other threats from 
state government, notably by reinvigorating the Compact Clause.  
I. CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM AS A PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM 
 Leaving the constitutional distribution of powers between the federal and state governments up to 
the political process creates the possibility that politician-agents will resolve federalism issues in ways 
inimical to the interests of voter-principals. As Justice O’Connor points out in her opinion for the Court in 
New York v. United States, “[t]he Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of 
the States or state governments as abstract political entities” but rather “for the protection of individual” 
citizens.8 In some instances, “powerful incentives might lead both federal and state officials to view 
departures from the federal structure to be in their personal interests."9 How likely is such an eventuality?  
This Part shows that principal-agent theory provides a far from reassuring answer to this question. 
Principal-agent problems can arise in any situation in which one person – the “agent” -  is required to 
serve the interests of another (the “principal”) rather than his or her own, even in cases where the two may 
diverge. In such situations, a “moral hazard” is created for the agent, in that he or she is tempted to misuse 
the authority granted to her, and advance her own objectives at the expense of those of the principal. 
Conflicts of interest between principals and agents are common in both the public and private sectors, and 
a large social science literature has addressed these problems, particularly since the 1970s.10 
The issue of constitutional federalism is one where classic principal-agent problems are likely to be 
especially severe. The literature shows that principal-agent problems are particularly likely in situations 
where there are multiple principals 11 and situations where there is a large information asymmetry between 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
8New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181-82 (1992). 
 
9 Id. at 182. 
 
10 See works cited in nn. 
11 See, e.g, Oliver Hart, Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications, 105 Econ. J. 678, 681 (1995); 
Shleifer & Vishny, supra note at 741-42. 
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principals and agents that favors the latter.12 Constitutional federalism exhibits both of these problems in 
an unusually severe form. Moreover, as we shall see, the federalism case lacks several of the most 
important control mechanisms that are used to overcome principal-agent problems in the corporate 
setting. 
A. Information Asymmetry. 
Voter knowledge of the distribution of power between the federal and state governments is part of 
the more general problem of widespread political ignorance. Decades of social science research on 
political knowledge has shown that most voters have extremely low knowledge levels.13 As one leading 
political scientist puts it, “[n]othing strikes the student of public opinion and democracy more forcefully 
than the paucity of information most people possess about politics.”14  
To borrow the terminology of political scientist Stephen Bennett, almost one third of American 
adults are political “know nothings” who possess little or no useful knowledge of politics.15 For present 
                                                 
12 See, e.g., Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. 
ECON. REV. 777  (1972); Eric Abrahamson & Choelsoon Park, Concealment of Negative Organizational Outcomes: 
An Agency Theory Perspective, 37 Acad. Mgmt. J. (1994); Michael Jensen & William Meckling,  Theory of the 
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976); Moe, supra note at 
755-57. 
 
13 For the most thorough political science analysis of voter ignorance see MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT 
KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS (1996) (documenting widespread voter 
ignorance and explaining the importance of political knowledge to the democratic process); see also SCOTT L. 
ALTHAUS, COLLECTIVE PREFERENCES IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS (2003) (providing additional evidence of 
widespread political ignorance); Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New 
Perspective on the “Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, IOWA L. REV. (Forthcoming 2004) (analyzing 
implications of voter ignorance for constitutional theory [hereafter, Somin, Countermajoritarian Difficulty; Ilya 
Somin, Voter Ignorance and the Democratic Idea, 12 CRITICAL REV. 413 (1998) (assessing dangers of voter 
ignorance and  critically analyzing literature on the subject) [hereafter, Somin, Voter Ignorance]. 
 
14 John Ferejohn, Information and the Electoral Process, in INFORMATION AND DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES 3, 3 (eds. 
John Ferejohn & James Kuklinski 1990). 
 
15  Stephen E. Bennett, ‘Know-Nothings’ Revisited: The Meaning of Political Ignorance Today, 69 SOC. SCI. Q. 476 
(1988).  Bennett’s 1988 article extended a 1947 study by Herbert Hyman and Paul Sheatsley, which also found that 
about one third of the public are “know nothings” in their understanding of politics. See Herbert Hy man & Paul 
Sheatsley, Some Reasons Why Information Campaigns Fail , 11 PUB. OPINION Q. 412 (1947). For data indicating that 
the proportion of know-nothings remains roughly as high today as at the time of Bennett’s study, see Somin, 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty. 
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purposes, it is important to stress that the majority of citizens lack basic “rules of the game” knowledge,16 
information about which public officials and agencies are responsible for what issues. For example, the 
majority do not know the respective functions of the three branches of government, who has the power to 
declare war, or what institution controls monetary policy. 17 A related problem is that citizens are often 
ignorant of which political party controls what institutions of government.18 Political knowledge has 
remained consistently low for decades, with no indication that a substantial increase is likely in the 
foreseeable future. 19 Without an understanding of the basic elements of the political system, most citizens 
are also unlikely to know much about the division of power between federal and state governments. 
Widespread political ignorance makes it difficult for voters to control policy outcomes in general, 
but especially on complex and nontransparent issues such as the distribution of power between the federal 
and state governments. Federalism questions are unusually complex because they involve a wide range of 
policy areas and complicated intergovernmental relations, most notably the vast system of federal grants 
to state governments, which account for some 30% of all state expenditures.20 Moreover, public attention 
rarely focuses on federalism as a general matter. Federalism is an abstract and complicated system 
compared to many underlying public policy issues like drugs and education, which are more concrete and 
                                                 
16 The term “rules of the game” is borrowed from Delli Carpini & Keeter, supra  note at 69-70. 
 
17 Id. at 70-71. 
 
18 A survey taken immediately after the November 2002 congressional elections found that only about 32% of 
respondents knew that the Republicans had held control of the House of Representatives prior to the election.  Data 
calculated from National Election Study 2002, variable 025083. Data from the 2002 National Election Study is 
available from the author or from the National Election Study website: http://www.umich.edu/~nes/. This result is 
consistent with evidence from other elections. See, e.g., NEUMANN, supra  note at 15; Stephen E. Bennett & Linda 
Bennett, Out of Sight Out of Mind: Americans’ Knowledge of Party Control of the House of Representatives, 1960-
1984, 35 POL. RES. Q. 67 (1992). 
 
19 For studies showing little or no increase in political knowledge over time, see Delli Carpini & Keeter, supra  note 
11 chs. 2-3; ERIC R.A.N. SMITH, THE UNCHANGING AMERICAN VOTER (1989); Bennett, supra  note; Stephen E. 
Bennett, Know-Nothings Revisited Again, 18 POL. BEHAVIOR 219 (1996); Stephen E. Bennett, Trends in Americans’ 
Political Information, 1967-87, 17 AM. POL. Q. 422 (1989); Michael X. Delli Carpini & Scott Keeter, Stability and 
Change in the U.S. Public’s Knowledge of Politics, 55 PUB. OPINION Q. 583 (1991); but cf. Althaus, supra note at 
215 (showing a very small increase in knowledge when comparing the 1980-88 period to 1990-98). The increase 
shown in Althaus’ study is extremely low (fro m an average of 52% correct answers in the earlier period to 54% in 
the later one), and may be an artifact of the particular questions studied. Id. 
 
20 Somin, supra note, at. 
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more likely to engage the passions of citizens. Thus, when a federalism issue becomes a matter of public 
controversy, it almost always focuses on the specific policy question at hand rather than on federalism 
more generally.  
One reason that citizens may have less understanding of federalism today than they did in the past 
is that sentiments that may have previously motivated citizens to take an interest in and protect federalism 
have faded.21  The huge decrease in transportation costs and information costs in the twentieth century has 
created a mass culture that has largely extirpated state differences and has even substantially tempered 
regional ones.22  It is more difficult to feel strongly about states’ rights if you live in New Jersey and work 
in New York for a company with its headquarters in Texas.  The social changes responsible for this 
decline in local attention seem irreversible and may be accelerating.  As a result citizens lack the 
attachments to their states that may have motivated them to pay attention to issues of federal structure in 
the past. 23 
Low levels of political knowledge about federalism are not merely accidental, but are also in part 
a result of “rational ignorance” caused by the insignificance of any one vote to electoral outcomes, and 
the consequent lack of incentive for voters to acquire political information solely for the purpose of 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
21 See Cathleen C. Herasimchuck, The New Federalism: Judicial Legislation by the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1483 (1990).  (“Increasing mobility, instantaneous national communications networks, 
continued movement to national economic, educational and legal standards and the emergence of a national culture 
suggests that American values are less state oriented”). 
 
22  See John O. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville’s America: The Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence of Social 
Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485 , 525 (2002).  
 
23Even in the years immediately prior to the Civil War, when state attachments were much stronger, the specific 
issue of slavery understandably overshadowed the broader question of federal and state power. Southern leaders 
routinely took an anti-centralization position when such a stance favored slavery and a pro-centralization view when 
the reverse was true, as in their uncompromising insistence on enforcement of the federal Fugitive Slave Law. See 
Robert Kaczorowski, The Tragic Irony of American Federalism: National Sovereignty Versus State Sovereignty in 
Slavery and Freedom, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1015, 1025-40 (1997) (describing this aspect of the Southern position on 
the Fugitive Slave Clause). By contrast, northern state governments seeking to protect the rights of fugitive slaves 
insisted on a narrow construction of federal power on that issue, while supporting broader federal authority in cases 
where it worked to their advantage. Id. at 1034-40; see also Somin, supra  note at 467 n.33 (citing sources discussing 
the northern states’ position on fugitive slave law). 
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casting a “better” vote  . 24   The acquisition of political information is a classic collective action problem, 
a situation in which a good (here, an informed electorate) is undersupplied because any one individual’s 
possible contribution to its production is insignificant. And those who do not contribute will still get to 
enjoy the benefits of the good if it is successfully provided through the efforts of others.25 
For these reasons, citizen-principals and both federal and state elected officials are divided by a 
vast informational asymmetry. The latter have every incentive to acquire detailed knowledge of the 
federal-state balance, while the former have little or none.  Indeed, the information asymmetry may be 
greater on issues of constitutional structure than on issues of constitutional individual rights. Citizens are 
usually more passionately engaged and focused on their liberties than on federalism and the separation of 
powers.   Moreover, for similar reasons, when a crisis that has caused government officials to abandon 
constitutional restraints has passed, citizens are more likely to be interested in restoring the original 
settlement on civil liberties than in reviving the original constitutional structure.26 Witness the continuing 
broad discussion of the need to restore civil liberties post 9-11 compared to the paucity of popular 
discussion on whether a revival of federalism is necessary.  From the perspective of rational ignorance 
theory, judicial review may be more necessary to restrain government agents from violating its structural 
provisions than provisions relating to individual rights. This important point reverses the conventional 
wisdom in constitutional law, which traditionally claims that individual rights are more in need of judicial 
protection than the structural constitution. 27  
                                                 
24 ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY ch. 13 (1957). Because of the very low significance of 
any single vote,  see William H. Riker & Peter Ordeshook, A Theory of the Calculus of Voting, 62 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 25 (1968) (demonstrating that the chance of any one vote determining the outcome of a presidential election is 
roughly 1 in 100 million). There is a vanishingly small payoff to acquiring political knowledge in order to vote 
accurately. Id. Even if a voter makes a tremendous effort to become highly informed, there is almost no chance that 
his or her well-informed vote will actually swing the electoral outcome in favor of the “better” candidate or party. 
 
25 For general discussions of collective action theory, see the classic work of Mancur Olson, MANCUR OLSON, THE 
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965). See also  RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982) (extending Olson’s 
argument with various applications to political participation). 
 
26  See Rebecca Kahan, The Expanding State (paper on file with author). 
 
27  See, e,g., JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS, 175-176, 263 (1980) (giving 
priority to judicial review of individual rights rather than constitutional structure).  For other reasons as well, the 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art9
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B. Multiple Principals. 
 The problem of asymmetric information is exacerbated by the presence of numerous multiple 
principals, as opposed to a single leader or a small, cohesive group. Other things equal, the larger the 
number of principals, the less incentive any of them have to monitor the performance of the agent. As 
economist, Oliver Hart, explains in the context of the monitoring of corporate executives by “dispersed 
shareholders,” members of a large group of principals have “little or no incentive to monitor 
management.” The reason is that monitoring is a public good: if one shareholder’s monitoring leads to 
improved company performance, all shareholders benefit. Given that monitoring is costly, each 
shareholder is likely to “free ride” in the hope that other shareholders will do the monitoring.28 While it is 
certainly not the case that all citizens free ride in this way, it is undeniably true that very few do much to 
monitor the federal-state balance, and that those few who do engage in extensive monitoring are highly 
unrepresentative of the general population,29 and, in any event,  not numerous enough to ensure an 
adequately informed citizenry. 30 Indeed, the problem of multiple principals is especially acute among 
voters because there are tens of millions of people involved, which both increases the possibility of free 
riding and exacerbates the cost of coordinating monitoring activities. 
                                                                                                                                                             
case for judic ial enforcement of federalism may be more compelling for that of individual rights. For instance, 
judicial enforcement of minority individual rights can easily create a backlash by depriving citizens of ordinary 
political fora in which to debate and compromise issues. See Michael Klarman, Brown, Racial Change and the Civil 
Rights Movement, 80 VA. REV. L. 7 (1994) (discussing judicial backlash to individual rights decisions concerning 
segregation and the rights of alleged communists).  Sometimes there may be a backlash to the backlash, as in the 
civil rights movement and the cause of the individual right may be advanced. See Klarman, xx. But the 
consequences of such reaction depend on future political contingencies which the Court cannot easily predict. 
Federalism cases, by contrast, are often likely to redirect political energies to either the state or the federal level, 
depending on which forum the Court has held to be constitutionally appropriate to resolve the issue. While this will 
not always prevent backlashes, as New Deal-era agitation against the Court showed, it often will do so, as the lack of 
political backlash against Lopez and Morrison  demonstrate.   
 
28 Hart, supra note at 681; see also Shleifer & Vishny, supra note at 741-44 (summarizing literature showing  that 
multiple principals lead to an undersupply of effective monitoring); cf. David Martimort, Exclusive Dealing, 
Common Agency, and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory, 27  Rand J. Econ. 1 (1996) (analyzing principal-agent 
problems caused by multiple principals in marketing arrangements). 
 
29 See Somin, Countermajoritarian Difficulty (presenting evidence showing that the knowledgeable minority of 
voters is highly unrepresentative on a wide range of parameters); Althaus, supra note (same). 
 
30 See Somin, Voter Ignorance at 419-31 (arguing that small numbers of knowledgeable voters are not enough to 
offset the ignorance of the vast majority). 
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 Free riding and information asymmetry are integrally connected. The theory of rational ignorance 
suggests that collective action problems are a large part of the reason why so few voters are informed 
about the doings of their political agents.31 However, the problem of multiple principals has independent 
significance because it suggests that even those voters who do possess substantial knowledge of 
federalism issues may not have a strong incentive to use that knowledge effectively as a monitoring tool. 
Rational ignorance and the insignificance of any one vote to electoral outcomes may give voters an 
incentive to stick to misleading heuristics and factually inaccurate political beliefs.32 Collective problems 
limit not only the amount of information that voters acquire but “how rationally they process the 
information they do have.”33  Thus the problems of rational ignorance and multiple principals combine to 
impede the monitoring of government officials. 
C.   Lack of Credible Commitment and the Tragedy of the Federalism Commons. 
Partly as result of these information problems, federalism considerations are often given short 
shrift in policy debates. The current political battle over the Federal Marriage Amendment and same-sex 
marriage is an excellent example of the tendency of both liberal and conservative politicians and activists 
to subordinate federalism considerations to the pursuit of political advantage on specific issues. Recent 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
31 See nn. and accompanying text. 
 
32 See Bryan Caplan, Rational Ignorance vs. Rational Irrationality, 54 KYKLOS 3 (2001) (showing that the 
insignificance of any one vote leads voters to base their decisions on misleading heuristics and poorly developed 
opinions because, for any individual voter, there is little or no cost to holding inaccurate views). 
 
33 Id. at 5. 
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debates over federal partial birth abortion bans,34 state medical marijuana laws,35 and the No Child Left 
Behind education bill,36 illustrate the same trend. 
 But the subordination of federalism to other goals is also due in part to the lack of a credible 
commitment to enforcing federalism.37 Failure to enforce federalism constraints naturally leads to the 
subordination of federalism to substantive policy objectives. In the absence of a credible commitment to 
federalism, it is irrational even for those who would prefer a consistent respect for federalism to their 
particular first order substantive policies to act on such preferences.  They have no assurance that their 
political opponents will similarly respect federalism. If they hold back on pursuing their preferred policies 
for the sake of federalism, they take a risk that their forbearance will result in neither a coherent 
federalism nor their preferred substantive policies.  Like fish in a pond without enforced rules against 
overfishing, federalism in a federal system without systematic enforcement of rules against its abrogation 
can disappear, even when most citizens would prefer its continuation. A similar dynamic would occur if 
citizens could not rely on a credible commitment to the First Amendment. Even those who favor free 
speech as a general policy would have an incentive to try to suppress speech by their political opponents 
because they would have no assurance that their own speech would be protected should those opponents 
come to power.38 
                                                 
34 See Sylvia A. Law, In the Name of Federalism: The Supreme Court’s Assault on Democracy and Civil Rights, 70 
U. Cin. L. Rev. 367, 409-11 (2002) (noting conservative support for a federal ban on partial birth abortions, despite 
its incongruity with conservative views on limited federal power).  
 
35 Nelson Lund, Why Ashcroft is Wrong on Assisted Suicide, 113 Commentary 59 (2002) (criticizing the Bush 
administration’s effort to suppress Oregon’s state law permitting medical uses of marijuana as inconsistent with 
federalism). 
 
36 See Sam Dillon, President’s Initiative to Shake up Education is Facing Protests in Many State Capitols, N.Y. 
Times, Mar. 8, 2004 at 12 (noting liberal Democratic criticisms of the Act for excessive intrusion on state autonomy 
in education policy). 
 
37 On the importance of constitutional enforcement of credible commitments in providing incentives for political 
actors to respect valuable conventions of mutual restraint, see Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, 
Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century 
England , 49 J. ECON. HIST . 803, 803 (1989).  
 
38 See David P. Bryden, A Conservative Case for Judicial Activism, 111 Public Interest (Spring 1993) (making the 
point that a commitment to reciprocity is essential to the protection of free speech). 
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D. The Paucity of Non-Judicial Solutions to the Principal-Agent Problem.  
 Principal-agent theory first became prominent in the social sciences because of its usefulness in 
analyzing issues of corporate governance. The literature on principal-agent problems in the corporate field 
outlines four major mechanisms that stockholders use to reduce the dangers they face: the use of large 
stockholders to overcome collective action problems, using the market value of stock to keep track of 
management’s performance, performance-based contracts, the threat of lawsuits for breach of fiduciary 
duty or violation of stockholder rights, and “hostile takeovers” by competitors of incumbent managers. 39  
Here we briefly show why all four are either unavailable or greatly attenuated in political markets. 
1. Large stockholders. 
A large stockholder with a major stake in a given corporation has an incentive to both acquire 
information about the effectiveness of management and use that information to monitor its performance.40 
The large stockholder has much less incentive to free ride on the efforts of others than a small one 
because he or she internalizes far more of the benefits of effective monitoring.  Unfortunately, the 
political market has no similar mechanism because giving some citizens disproportionate voting power 
violates the fundamental democratic principle of equal voting rights.41 To be sure, some citizens certainly 
do have a greater stake in the federal-state balance than others and they may end up acquiring 
disproportionate knowledge and influence as a result. However, the background, interests, and incentives 
of the small minority of knowledgeable political activists diverge greatly from those of the much more 
ignorant majority. 42 Thus, they are not as effective as proxies for the majority as large stockholders may 
                                                 
39 For a survey of the literature on solutions to the principal-agent problem in corporate governance, see Shleifer & 
Vishny, supra note. 
 
40; Id. at 753-57; see also Abrahamson & Park, supra note; Mike Burkart, et al., Large Shareholders, Monitoring, 
and the Value of the Firm, 112 Q. J. Econ. 693 (1997); Hart, supra note at 683-84. 
 
41 For a detailed analysis of this principle, see, e.g., Robert Dahl, Democracy and its Critics (1989). 
. 
42 See, e.g., SIDNEY VERBA, ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY chs. 9-16 (1995) (showing that political activists are 
drawn primarily from a small, unrepresentative, high-knowledge elite) Somin, Voter Ignorance. 
. 
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be for small ones in the corporate setting.  Moreover, even in cases where the knowledgeable minority 
does have the same interest on federalism issues as the majority, the minority’s ability to translate their 
superior knowledge into effective monitoring is not as great as that of large stockholders in the corporate 
setting because it controls only a tiny fraction of the vote. 
2. Using the price of stock as an information shortcut. 
Stockholders with very little knowledge of their corporations can still get some sense of 
management’s performance by keeping track of the stock’s price.43 Other things equal, poor-performing 
executives should cause the value of their firm’s stock to drop, while good ones will cause it to rise. The 
use of the price system as an effective information shortcut is one of the most important advantages of a 
market system.44 Unfortunately, the political market generally lacks information shortcuts that are 
anywhere near as simple and effective as the price system.45 Indeed, without a prior foundation of basic 
knowledge that large numbers of citizens lack, the use of information shortcuts in politics often misleads 
voters as much as informs them.46 This is particularly true with respect to unusually complex and non-
transparent issues such as the federal-state balance.  
3. Fiduciary duties and minority shareholder rights. 
An additional safeguard against principal-agent problems in the corporate world is the possibility 
of suits against corporate managers for violation of fiduciary duties or for undercutting the rights of 
minority shareholders.47 For obvious reasons, such legal remedies are rarely available against political 
                                                 
43 FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 18-19 (1991). 
 
44For the classic analysis, see F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 Am. Econ. Rev. 519 (1945). 
 
45 For a detailed analysis of the inadequacies of information shortcuts for voters, see Somin, Voter Ignorance at 419-
31 and literature cited therein; see also Althaus, supra note (providing still more evidence that shortcuts fail to offset 
ignorance). 
 
46 Somin, Voter Ignorance at 427-29; see also Ilya Somin, Resolving the Democratic Dilemma? 16 YALE J. ON REG. 
401, 410-11 (1999) (showing how shortcuts can mislead). 
 
47 For summaries of the issues and literature, see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note at ch. 4; Shleifer & Vishny, 
supra note at 750-53. 
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office-holders. Although the latter may be sometimes sued for committing torts against citizens 48 or for 
violating specific constitutional rights of individuals,49 they cannot generally be sued by individual 
plaintiffs for adopting harmful policies. 
4. The Market for Corporate Control 
One other important way of containing the principal-agent problem in corporate law is the market 
for corporate control. 50 If managers fail to obtain the highest possible value for shareholders, they face the 
possibility of a takeover of the corporation and the loss of their positions. This prospect aligns their 
interests with those of shareholders and provides incentives to better manage the corporation on their 
behalf.51  For this reason, while the judiciary eschews most scrutiny over the business decisions of 
corporate boards and their officers, it does sometimes intervene to prevent corporate management from 
using devices, such as the “poison pill,” that frustrate the market for corporate control and exacerbate 
principal-agent problems within the corporation. 52   
Of course, states are not sold on the stock exchange and thus are not subject to such market 
discipline. There is no direct political equivalent to the market for corporate control. But we argue below 
that federalism does create something analogous to the market for governance, as individuals can exit 
states where their agents—state officials—are operating in a manner that does not reflect the interests of 
citizens. In that way, federalism too generates a market that helps align the interests of citizens and their 
rulers. The judiciary, as in the corporate context, should eschew most substantive oversight, but should 
prevent state and federal governments from adopting rules that undermine competition. 
                                                 
48 See, e.g, Federal Tort Claims Act. 
 
49 See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (key precedent establishing 
principle that federal officials may be sued for violating citizen constitutional rights). 
 
50 Henry Manne was first to articulate the importance of this market for corporate governance. See Henry Manne, 
Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 1101 (1965).  
 
51  See Troy A. Parades, The Firm and the Nature of Control:  Toward a Theory of Takeover Law, 29 IOWA J. CORP. 
L. 103, 1001 (2003) (explaining how the market for corporate control aligns interests of shareholders and managers). 
   
52 See Wells M. Endelow, Handicapping the Corporate Law Race, 28 IOWA. J. CORP. L. 143, 150 (2002) (noting 
that the judiciary intervenes to prevent management exploitation through such devices).  
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As corporate scandals have recently shown, principal-agent problems still plague the corporate 
setting. 53 Yet such problems are considerably more severe in political markets because the standard 
corporate market remedies are generally absent. 
D. The Failure of Political Safeguards . 
 
Even if voter-principals cannot themselves monitor the activities of their agents, many scholars 
have argued that the federal political process can take up the slack and safeguard federalism. However, 
our analysis undermines the argument that the political process will prove an effective substitute for 
judicial review.  The classic political safeguards argument asserts that the political branches can be relied 
upon to protect the autonomy of the states. Herbert Wechsler observed that Congress was composed of 
the representatives elected from the state and the President was elected by an electoral college that also 
was designed to protect state interests.54  Therefore, he claimed, the political process is a powerful 
guarantee that the values of state autonomy would not be slighted in federal legislation.  Jesse Choper 
deepened these arguments by noting that various lobbying groups and the structure of congressional 
committee and leadership systems also served to protect state interests.55  More recently, Larry Kramer 
has argued that a structure outside the political system - the political parties - will protect state interests 
because members of Congress and the President are "politically dependent upon state and party 
organizations."56 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
53 For a summary of the principal-agent issues in Enron and other similar cases, see John C. Coffee, Jr., What 
Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 269, 297-301 (2004). 
 
54 See Herbert Weschler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in Composition and the 
Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1980).  
55 See JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 176-181 (1980). 
56 See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 278 
(2000)  
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 This theory has been attacked on the grounds that the federal political processes do not in fact 
protect states.  Federal officials are not always motivated to protect state interests.57 National lobbying 
groups of special interests are sometimes more effective than lobbying groups on behalf of the states and 
thus federal officials are likely to ignore state interests.  Political parties are often more responsive to the 
demands of national special interests than those of state governments.58   
We do not disagree with these criticisms of the political safeguards theory, but our critique is 
more fundamental. The theory depends on the premise that either state officials or individual state citizens 
will prompt federal officials to respect federalism. We believe that this premise is unfounded. Because of 
rational ignorance, individual citizens are usually unable to protect federalism even when it would be in 
the public interest to do so. Moreover, state officials have systematic political interests that often cause 
them to undermine federalism. We detail these below. Thus, the flaws in the political safeguards 
argument are even deeper than previously recognized.  No political actors – neither federal officials, nor 
state officials, nor the general public -- have an incentive to systematically protect constitutional 
federalism.  Indeed, the political power of both state and federal office-holders is as likely to be used to 
                                                 
57 See John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311 (1997).  
 
58 See Paul Frymer & Albert Yoon, Political Parties, Representation and Federal Safeguards, 96 N. W. U. L. REV. 
977, 1025 (2002).   
60 Our critique of political safeguards also is more far reaching that of Professors Baker and Young, as sound as that 
critique is. See Lynn A. Baker & Ernest Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE 
L. J. 75 (2001).  They note correctly that some states may engage in horizontal aggrandizement and try to impose 
their preferences on other states. Id. at  x. In the cases they describe state officials are acting in the interest of their 
state citizens in exporting their values and this is an example of how state officials can have political interests that 
undermine the constitutional distribution of powers assigned to the states. But our point is more general in two ways.  
First, there is no necessary congruence between a state official’s political interest and the distribution of powers, 
regardless of the preferences of his state’s citizens.  Professors Baker’s and Young’s examples are specific instances 
of our more general theorem that officials are unlikely to enforce sound second order constitutional structures, 
because there is a mismatch between their interests and enforcement of the proper distribution.  Second, our theory 
is more comprehensive because we show that federal officials have a similar disinclination to protect the exercise of 
their own powers. We thus provide a comprehensive rationale for judicial intervention in favor of federalism’s 
distribution, whether that intervention happens to be in favor of state or federal governments . 
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undermine federalism as to protect it. The case against political safeguards theory is even stronger than 
that made out by earlier critics.60   
 Second, our critique does not depend on a claim that state autonomy requires special protection. 
Instead, state autonomy should be protected as simply one aspect of distribution of powers to state and 
federal actors. As we will show below, federal actors often lack the political motivation to protect 
constitutional federalism against infringement by state governments and the judiciary has often properly 
stepped in to protect federalism. Thus, the argument for judicial review of federal statutes for conformity 
with the constitution is not based on special pleading for state autonomy.   Instead it flows from the public 
interest in maintaining a federal structure despite the frequent interest of both state and federal officials in 
subverting it. Our theory, unlike the political safeguards argument and previous critiques thereof, provides 
an explanation of why the federal judiciary should intervene to constrain state government encroachments 
on federal power, as well as the reverse.  
 In New York v. United States the Rehnquist Court began to suggest a similar critique of the 
political safeguards argument and asserted a justification for judicial review of federalism similar to that 
which we advance.61 In New York , the Court rejected on structural grounds a statute in which, under 
certain criteria , the federal government ordered states to take title to nuclear waste. The Court held that 
such “commandeering” was unconstitutional. One of its rationales was an implicit response to the 
political safeguards argument along the lines we suggest. The Court noted that it could be in the interest 
of both state and government officials to deflect responsibility by acquiescing in a commandeering 
scheme. “If a federal official is faced with the alternatives of choosing a location or directing the states to 
do it, the official may well prefer the latter, as a means of shifting responsibility for the eventual decision. 
If a state official is faced with the same set of alternatives–choosing a location or having Congress direct 
the choice of a location–the state official may also prefer the latter, as it may permit the avoidance of 
                                                 
61 New York v United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
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personal responsibility.”62 Thus the political safeguards break down in a double attempt to avoid federal 
and state accountability. 
 In New York , the Rehnquist Court even highlighted the precise theme of this article: that 
“powerful incentives might lead both federal and state officials to view departures from the federal 
structure to be in their personal interests.”63  While it did not discuss the problem of rational ignorance, 
that theme is also implicit in its claim that citizens may mistakenly blame state officials for federal actions 
or vice versa.64  This joint deflection of responsibility would not fool a citizenry that was well informed 
about federal and state policies and that had the incentive to make use of that information. Unfortunately, 
the Court has not generalized this insight across the full range of federalism issues. We try to do so here.   
II. A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE ADVANTAGES OF FEDERALISM. 
 Three key benefits of federalism are central to our analysis: the satisfaction of diverse local 
preferences, horizontal competition between states, and vertical competition between the states and the 
federal government. While there are other potential advantages of a federal system, such as the possibility 
of increasing political participation and strengthening community,65 these three are the ones most likely to 
be advanced by judicial review. 
A. Diversity. 
Responsiveness to diverse local preferences is perhaps the oldest and best known rationale for 
federalism, receiving an endorsement from the Supreme Court in one of the first major Rehnquist-era 
federalism decisions.66 To the extent that local majorities in different states have divergent preferences 
                                                 
62 Id. at 183. 
63  Id. at 182.  
 
64 Id. at 182-83. 
 
65 See, e.g., McConnell, supra note at 1507-11 (summarizing community and political participation rationales for 
federalism); but cf. Edward Rubin & Malcolm Feely, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. 
Rev. 903 (1994) (arguing that this rationale is anachronistic in an era when our “true” community is national in 
scope). 
 
66 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (noting that federalism “assures a decentralized government that 
will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society”). 
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from each other, a federal system can ensure a higher degree of citizen satisfaction than a unitary polity. 67 
If, for example, some state-level majorities prefer a policy of high taxes and high leve ls of government 
services while others prefer low taxes and low service levels, they can each be accommodated by their 
respective state governments.  A unitary government with a one-size-fits-all policy will, by contrast, 
likely leave a larger proportion of the population dissatisfied with the resulting mix of policies. The 
ability of federalism to accommodate diverse preferences can ease racial, ethnic, religious, and 
ideological conflicts by allowing each of the opposing groups to control policy in its own region. 68 The 
ability of federalism to satisfy diverse preferences is augmented by citizen mobility. 69 If citizens find 
themselves in a state whose policies are at odds with their preferences, they can move to another state 
with more favorable ones. So long as there is diversity between state policies and interstate mobility is not 
forbidden, this benefit holds true even if state governments make no deliberate effort to attract migrants. 
B. Horizontal competition between state governments. 
Horizontal competition between states is a major benefit of federalism distinct from that of 
interstate diversity taken in and of itself, though closely related to it.70 Whereas the theory of interstate 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
67 For brief summaries of the diversity rationale for federalism, see, e.g., DIETMAR WELLISCH, THEORY OF PUBLIC 
FINANCE IN A FEDERAL STATE 14-15 (2000);  WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM 11-13 (1972); Michael 
McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1493-95 (1987). 
 
68 DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT 601-28 (1985);  GORDON C. TULLOCK, THE NEW 
FEDERALIST 39-52 (1994). 
 
69For the classic analysis, see Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 
(1956). 
 
70 The literature on interstate competition and its benefits is vast. For some of the more important works, see 
GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE POWER TO TAX 173-86 (1980); ALBERT BRETON, COMPETITIVE 
GOVERNMENTS (1996); ALBERT BRETON & ANTHONY SCOTT, THE DESIGN OF FEDERATIONS 13-19 (1980); DYE, 
supra  note 3;  OATES, supra  note 13; WELLISCH, supra  note; James M. Buchanan, Federalism as an Ideal Political 
Order and an Objective for Constitutional Reform, 21 PUBLIUS 19 (1995); McConnell, supra  note  at 1497-1500; 
Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism,37 J. ECON. LIT . 1120, 1134-37 (1999); Wallace E. Oates & 
Robert Schwab, Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Efficiency Distorting? 35 J. 
PUB. ECON. 333 (1988); Tiebout, supra  note 15; Barry Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: 
Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (1995); Ralph K. Winter, 
Private Goals and Competition Among State Legal Systems, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 127 (1982). For an early 
precursor to this literature, see F.A. Hayek, The Economic Conditions of Interstate Federalism, 5 NEW 
COMMONWEALTH Q. 131 (1939). 
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diversity assumes merely that states are responsive to the “voice” preferences of citizen-voters already 
residing within their boundaries, the theory of interstate competition asserts that states actively compete 
with each other to attract new citizens, who can improve their lot through the power of “exit rights.” 71   
Conversely, they also strive to ensure that current residents will not depart for greener pastures offered by 
competitors. Citizens dissatisfied with state policy not only have the option of lobbying for change, but 
also of moving to another state that deliberately seeks to attract them with more favorable policies. To the 
benefits of political voice provided by interstate diversity, the possibility of interstate competition adds 
those of exit.  Horizontal competition has the additional advantage of encouraging experimentation as 
governments compete with one another in social policy. Moreover, such interjurisdictional competition 
can often protect the general public special interest policies. The citizenry’s ability to exit makes their 
political leaders more responsive to them and less apt to show favor to interest groups whose objectives 
conflict with those of the majority of citizens.72 
Interstate competition is motivated, in part, by the desire of state governments to attract taxpaying 
citizens and corporations, which has the effect of increasing the funds available to them for public 
spending of all kinds. This, in turn, improves the electoral prospects of state officials.73 In theory, states 
have an incentive to seek to attract all migrants who pay more in taxes than they receive in state-funded 
benefits.74 Even some migrants who do not “pay for themselves” may be attractive to states if they 
increase the productivity of other citizens or enterprises sufficiently to offset the additional expenditures 
                                                 
71 ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT , VOICE AND LOYALTY (1970). Hirschman argues that voice and exit are often in 
conflict and may undermine each other. Id. at ch. 4.  However one of us has argued elsewhere that they are more 
likely to be mutually reinforcing. Ilya Somin, Revitalizing Consent , 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 753, 795-97 
(2000). 
 
72  Not all citizens have to be able to move for state policies to change. If some citizens whose mobility makes them 
particularly sensitive to bad polices have the ability to move the state may change its policies and benefit even those 
who are less mobile or sensitive to the effects of bad policies.  See Nelson Lund and John O. McGinnis, Lawrence 
and Judicial Hubris, 102 MICH. L. REV. xx (2004).  
 
73 DYE, supra  note at 24-25. Tiebout, supra  note. 
 
74 See McConnell, supra  note 3, at 1499-1500 (noting that “since most people are taxpayers, [interstate competition] 
means that there is a powerful incentive for decentralized governments to make things better for most people”). 
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incurred as a result of their in-migration. For example, state and local governments often have an 
incentive to improve schools for children - who of course don’t pay taxes - in order to attract parents - 
who do. 
As transportation costs have fallen, and a national culture makes Americans feel more at home 
outside the state where they were born, citizens have become more mobile.78 This increased mobility 
means that more citizens are likely to move in response to suboptimal state policies. Thus, while some 
scholars have suggested that citizens’ increasing identification with a national community makes 
federalism obsolete,79 it actually strengthens the case for federalism by improving the conditions for 
horizontal competition. 80  
C. Vertical competition between states and the federal government. 
For the Founding Fathers and their generation, the main rationale for federalism was not  
                                                 
78 The percentage of the population consisting of individuals born outside their state of current residence has risen 
slowly but fairly steadily from 21 percent in 1900 to 40 percent today. See Series C-14, Native Population by 
Residence within Outside State, Division and Region of Birth, by Race: 1850-1970 printed in Historical Statistics of 
the United States: Colonial Times to 1970; http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/migration/80pob.txt  (1980 
data); http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/migration/90pob.txt  (1990); American Fact Finder, Table QT-
P22; http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTTable?_bm+y&01000US&-qr-name=DEC_ (2000 data). 
 
79  See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feely, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA  L. REV. 903, 
944-945 (1994) (arguing that states have “nothing but their legal definitions to distinguish them from one another”). 
 
80 See Robert D. Cooter, The Strategic Constitution 132 (2000) (“Parochial rights fit mobile societies and universal 
rights fit immobile societies”). 
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diversity or competition (the most familiar modern arguments), but the role of the state s as a bulwark 
against possible federal tyranny.81 As the case of state efforts to forestall enforcement of the federal 
Fugitive Slave Act dramatically illustrates,82 state governments can sometimes use their powers to block 
or mitigate federal violations of fundamental individual rights.83 On a more prosaic level, state 
governments can compete with the federal government in providing public goods and social services.84 
Vertical competition, like horizontal, is not an unalloyed good. Nonetheless, some substantial capacity for 
competition is a major advantage of a federal system. 
 Diversity, vertical competition, and horizontal competition may all be undermined by various 
principal-agent problems in federalism’s political process. Both state and federal elected officials may be 
tempted to undermine them in various ways in order to advance their electoral and other interests. Thus, 
judicial restraint of federal government power will sometimes be necessary in order to ensure that the 
benefits of federalism are not lost. Importantly, however, judicial action is also needed to ensure that state 
governments do not undermine federalism. One of the important advantages of viewing federalism as a 
principal-agent problem is that it allows us to create a unified theory that incorporates judicial limits on 
both state and federal authority.  
III. LIMITING FEDERAL POWER: APPLICATIONS TO SPECIFIC DOCTRINES  
A. The Commerce Clause.    
                                                 
81See e.g.  FEDERALIST 46 (arguing that “the State governments will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete 
security against invasions of the public liberty by the national authority”). See also AKHIL AMAR, THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS (1998) (arguing that strengthening of the states as a barrier to federal tyranny was the main motivation 
behind the adoption of the Bill of Rights); Martin Diamond, The Ends of Federalism, 3 PUBLIUS 156 (1973) 
(arguing that protection against federal tyranny was the key element of the Founders’ view of federalism). 
 
82 FONER, supra  note, at 134-39; ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975); Kaczarowski, supra note. In the early 
twentieth century, state and local governments sometimes acted to protect the free speech rights of unpopular 
political activists condemned by federal courts.  See DAVID RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 
(1997). 
 
83 For a modern proposal to institutionalize such protection by means of state-created “converse-1983” actions 
against abusive federal officials, see Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L. J. 1425 (1987). 
 
84 BRETON, supra  note  at 189-90; Pierre Salmon, Decentralization as an Incentive Scheme , 3 OXFORD REV. OF  
ECON. STUD. 24 (1987). 
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The Interstate Commerce Clause provides only a limited power to the federal government, 
permitting Congress to regulate domestic commerce only if it is “among the several states.”85  This 
limitation of the Commerce Clause generates some of the federalism policy advantages discussed above.   
It forces states to compete in social policy and the production of public goods when conduct regulated is 
either not commercial or “does not concern more states than one.”86 If a state’s regulation reduces public 
welfare, citizens and businesses can leave: this is the horizontal competition argument for federalism.87 
Regulatory competition among states in particular promotes experimentation in government, thus over 
time improving knowledge of social policy. 88  Second, as the diversity argument for federalism shows, the 
appropriate mix of public goods depends on the preferences of citizens.  Within the area of social policy 
reserved to them by the limitations of the Commerce Clause, states can tailor the mix of their regulations 
to their citizens’ preferences and citizens can move to states whose mix better matches their needs.89   
  When the New Deal and Warren Court almost completely abandoned the policing of the 
limitations of the Commerce Clause, they dissipated many of these advantages.90 The ordinary political 
process will not preserve them because political actors, state and federal, have no direct interest in their 
preservation.  While the limitations of the Commerce Clause contribute to the public interest, the 
                                                 
85  U.S. Const,, Art 1, sec. 8 , cl. 3.  
 
86 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194 (1824). 
 
87 See Richard Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 L. & CONTEMP . PROBS. 147, 149 (1992). 
88 See New State Ice Co. v. Liberman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, dissenting) (discussing federalism’s 
advantages in experimentation).  
89  The competitive federalism afforded by the limitations of the Commerce Clause may also have some costs as 
well. For instance, private entrepreneurs may try to use such competition to gain rents for themselves. To take one 
example, sports teams try to hold up states for subsidies by threatening to move elsewhere. They may succeed 
because of citizens’ rational ignorance and mistaken beliefs. Nevertheless we do not believe this kind of problem 
outweighs the benefits of competitive federalism.  First, over the long run, providing rents to such special interests 
raises taxes and leads to loss of investment and the migration of citizens. Second, Congress has the undoubted power 
to control such interstate competition in trying to stimulate interstate moves by commercial enterprises. 
 
90  See John O. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville’s America: The Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence of Social 
Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485, 499 (2002). 
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autonomy they provide states may often work to the detriment of state officials. Regulatory competition 
among the states may promote public welfare, but it can also hurt those state officials whose states fall 
behind in a competitive race. Experimentation has similar downsides because successful experiments in 
some states may undermine the competitive position of others. Therefore, some state governments may 
prefer a uniform federal regulation that preempts the issue.91 Finally, interest groups may benefit from the 
lack of jurisdictional competition92 and state officials have incentives to satisfy interests groups, 
particularly if they could do so in a way that is relatively nontransparent to voters.   
State officials here have incentives to behave analogously to private entrepreneurs who may 
benefit from a cartel even when market competition rebounds to the public  good.  State officials, in fact, 
may have even more substantial incentives to favor the preemption of federal law than private actors have 
to favor a cartel, because federal coercion can prevent competition for the long term, whereas private 
cartels are often undermined in relatively short order.93 
 The limitations of the Commerce Clause protect outlying preferences by leaving many social 
issues entirely to state regulation, but these issues may often relate to socially charged matters that pose 
electoral complications, because officials lack information about how they will exactly play out 
politically. 94 It is thus often in the political interest of state officials that the federal government address 
them and relieve them of responsibility for doing so.   
                                                 
91 Cf. Michael S. Greve, Compacts, Cartels, and Congressional Consent, 68 MO. L. REV. 285, 335 (2003) 
(discussing state efforts to form a tax cartel). 
 
92  See Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison’s Vision of the State: A Public Choice Perspective, 107 HARV. 
L. REV. 1328 (1994) (interest groups benefit from stifling jurisdictional competition). 
 
93 See John O. McGinnis, The Political Economy of International Antitrust, 45 Wm. & My. 549 (2003) (discussing 
how market forces destabilize cartels). 
94 See Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss? Imperfect Information as a Positive Influence in Political 
Institutions, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 917, 922-923 (1990) (politicians will try to avoid issues on which they lack sufficient 
information of electoral consequences).  Cf. Morris P. Fiorina, Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment 
46 (1989) (describing how members of Congress avoid controversy by focusing on pork barrel projects and 
casework). 
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  The statute the Supreme Court invalidated in United States v. Morrison95 illustrates another 
reason that state officials cannot be relied upon to make the political process work to preserve the 
advantages of federalism.  State authority is a second order value with little political salience to voters, 
thus making it harder for them to monitor the federalism implications of their agents’ actions.   Even if it 
has some long-term returns for a state official, these returns may well be swamped by the advantage a 
state official will get by taking a position on a first order issue that courts public acclaim.  For example, 
even if the Violence Against Women Act96 encroaches on state authority, taking a position that can be 
portrayed as hostile to women may be more electorally disadvantageous than opposing the act.  Indeed, 
thirty-six states signed an amicus brief supporting the federal statute in Morrison, while only one 
(Alabama) defended state authority. 97 Thus, given the relative lack of salience of structural issues with the 
electorate, we would predict over time that the constitutional distribution of powers will be continually 
sacrificed to position-taking on first order substantive issues.98 
 Accordingly, the Rehnquist Court’s judicial enforcement of the limitations of the Commerce 
Clause in Lopez and Morrison is entirely justified by our agency cost theory of federalism.  The Court 
implicitly recognizes that political safeguards will not protect the benefits of federalism, because state 
officials have little  interest in protecting second order values that may impose political costs on them.  As 
discussed below, the judiciary does not usually face such costs, enabling its members to preserve the 
beneficial distribution of powers in  the Constitution. 
B. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
                                                 
95 529 U.S. 598 (2001). 
 
96 Violence Against Woman Act of 1994 , Pub. L. L. No. 103-322 §40302, 108 Stat. 1941-1942 (codified as 
amendment, 42 U.S. C.  13981 (1994). 
 
97 Amicus Br. of 36 states. 
 
98 See the examples of assisted suicide, partial birth abortion, and the No Child Left Behind Act, discussed in nn. 
and accompanying text  above. 
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 This theory of federalism also provides support for the Court’s decision to oversee Congress’s use 
of its Section 5 power under the Fourteenth Amendment.99 While that power can be used legitimately, it 
can also be used to create uniform national rules that undermine the advantages of horizontal and vertical 
competition. Other scholars have persuasively shown that public choice problems mean that Congress 
will not engage in sensitive factual finding under Section 5 that would assure that they are making 
appropriate use of that power.100 What our framework adds is the proposition that sometimes state 
officials may welcome faulty fact-finding in the service of their interests and thus cannot be counted on  
to police congressional behavior.  Such interests may include all the interests that incline state officials to 
prefer a national rule even when the enumerated powers will provide them authority to set their own rule. 
As detailed above, these interests include preventing competition, avoiding a divisive issue, or taking a 
position that will resonate immediately with voters even at the expense of the longer term benefits of 
federalism.  Thus, the factors demonstrating the need for judicial policing of Congress’s Section 5 power 
parallel those supporting the need to police the limitations of the Commerce Clause. Both provisions raise 
similar principal-agent problems. 
  While we do not have the space to provide a comprehensive defense of the Rehnquist Court’s 
Section 5 jurisprudence, our principal-agent theory suggests that the Court is acting appropriately to 
protect federalism.  It has required that Congress provide evidence of unconstitutional discrimination 
when it is seeking to protect classes that are not suspect and limits that remedy to one that is “congruent 
and proportional” to the evidence found.101  In this way, the Court prevents Congress from using Section 
5 to create national rules on any subject it chooses—a process which undermines the advantages of 
                                                 
99 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (key Rehnquist Court decision on judicial oversight of Section 
5 power). But cf. Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S.Ct. 1978 (2004) (recent decision reinterpreting and possibly weakening 
Boerne in some respects, by allowing Congress greater latitude in using its Section 5 enforcement power in cases 
involving access to judicial services). 
 
100  See, e.g., Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 
DUKE L. J. 1169, 1184 (2001).  
  
101  See, e.g , Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).  
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federalism outlined above.102 At the same time, in contrast, the Rehnquist Court continues to permit 
Congress greater leeway to legislate under Section 5 to protect suspect classes that may face 
discrimination wherever they go. 103 
 
C. The Spending Power 
  The Court has at least begun to revive judicial review of the Commerce Clause and Section 5.   
In contrast, the Supreme Court continues to construe the Spending Clause104 to provide nearly a blank 
check for any spending that Congress chooses to undertake and to permit Congress to impose regulatory 
conditions that may parallel those barred by its Commerce Clause jurisprudence. In the leading case of 
South Dakota v. Dole,105 written by then Associate Justice Rehnquist himself, the Court summarized its 
Spending Clause jurisprudence and concluded that federal grants to state governments – the form of 
spending that arguably poses the greatest threat to federalism values- is constitutional so long as these 
grants 1) serve the “general welfare” under a standard that “defer[s] substantially to the judgment of 
Congress,” 2) state any conditions that the states must meet in order to acquire the funds 
“unambiguously,” 3) ensure that conditions are not “unrelated to the federal interest in particular national 
projects or programs” for which the funds were provided to the state, and 4) do not violate “other 
                                                 
102  The most prominent critics of the Rehnquist Court fail to take account of the kinds of principal-agent problems 
we focus on here. They therefore overstate the ability of the political process to protect structural federalism.  See, 
e.g., Robert Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric Restrictions on the 
Section 5 Power, 78 IND. L. J. 1 (2003).  If elected representatives, state and federal, were likely to take account of 
the structural advantages of federalism in ordinary politics or the people were likely to discipline them if they failed 
to do so, there would indeed be no reason for the judiciary to protect the Constitution by policing Congress.  But we 
have shown why these premises are unlikely to hold true. 
 
103  See John O. McGinnis, Decentralizing Constitutional Provisions v. Judicial Oligarchy, A Reply to Professor 
Koppelman, 20 CONST . COMM. 39 (2003) (offering reasons why the federal government may need the authority to 
protect discrete and insular minorities). 
   
104 U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. (providing Congress with the power to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and 
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and the general Welfare of the United States.”). 
 
105 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
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constitutional provisions.”106 Furthermore, the Court noted the possibility that federal grants might be 
invalidated if “the financial inducement offered by Congress [is] so coercive as to pass the point at which 
pressure turns into compulsion.”107  
 Conditions 1 and 4 do not impose any real limits on the spending power not already imposed by 
“other constitutional provisions.”108 Condition 2 likewise does not limit the substantive scope of federal 
grants to state governments, but merely ensures that state governments are informed of the terms under 
which federal funds are given to them.109 Condition 3 and the additional ban on federal “coercion” could 
potentially serve as significant restrictions on federal power, but have not been so interpreted in practice 
by the courts so far.110 In a recent decision, the Supreme Court has loosened the restraints on the Spending 
Power still further by holding that federal grants to state governments that have conditions only very 
loosely related to any federal purpose may be upheld under the Necessary and Proper Clause.111  
                                                 
106 Id. at 207-208. 
 
107 Id. at 211 (quotation omitted). 
 
108 Id. at 208. Condition 2 can be seen as an attempt to strengthen the political safeguards of federalism by making 
state officials aware of the restrictions Congress wishes to impose and thus increasing their ability to mobilize 
against such restrictions. But if state officials lack systematic interest in protecting their authority, putting them on 
notice that this authority is at risk may not offer much protection. Moreover, this condition may actually increase 
state incentives to accept federal grants, because it protects state government officials against unanticipated 
unpleasant consequences that might arise from ambiguously worded attached conditions. 
 
109 This requirement was already established prior to Dole. See Pennhurst  State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 
U.S.  1, 17 (1982) (holding that “the legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate [conditional grants] under the 
spending power . . . rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the ‘contract.’”)  
 
110 See Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending 
Doctrine and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke it to Do So, 78 Ind. L.J. 459, 512-21 (2003) (discussing 
weakness of these two possible restraints on the spending power); Rebecca E. Zietlow, Federalism’s Paradox: The 
Spending Power and Waiver of Sovereign Immunity, 37 Wake Forest L. Rev. 141, 180-82 nn.254-55, 265 (2002) 
(citing numerous cases that reject challenges to conditional spending grants based on these two parts of the Dole 
test);  but see Va. Dept. of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (holding a grant condition 
under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act unconstitutional in part because of its “coercive” nature). 
 
111 In Sabri v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1941 (2004), the Supreme Court recently rejected a challenge to 18 
U.S.C.  666(2) (b), a provision that imposes criminal penalties on anyone who bribes a state official so long as that 
state received more than $10,000 in federal funds.   The Court held that the imposition of this condition was 
necessary and proper to Congress’ interest in safeguarding federal funds, and was thus constitutional under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.  To the objection that provision required no connection between the bribery and 
federal funds, the Court replied that  “money is fungible, bribed officials are unworthy stewards of federal funds and 
corrupt contractors do not give dollar for dollar value.” Id. at  1949.  
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 As one of us has argued in greater detail elsewhere,112 the common weakness of Dole and its 
precursors is the excessive focus on the interests of state governments and the failure to consider the 
possibility that “noncoercive” grants that state governments actually want to accept might nonetheless 
undermine constitutional federalism. 113 Federal grants to state governments in fact tend to undermine all 
three of the major advantages of a federal system: horizontal competition, vertical competition between 
states and the federal government, and diversity.  114 It is often not recognized that federal grants with few 
or no attached conditions may be just as pernicious in these respects as those that impose rigorous 
requirements. 
 Federal subsidies to the states undermine interstate competition in two major ways. First, to the 
extent that horizontal competition is motivated by a desire to increase state tax revenue by attracting 
migrants or preventing outmigration, the existence of an alternative source of revenue necessarily 
                                                                                                                                                             
One way of understanding this holding is that Court is interpreting the nexus requirement of South Dakota 
v. Dole as being coterminous in scope with the Necessary and Proper Clause. While that may put the nexus 
requirement on a firmer textual foundation, the Court’s interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause is itself 
troubling. As Justice Thomas observed, see Sabri v. United States,  supra  at 1949, the majority treats “necessary and 
proper” as merely a requirement of loose means-end rationality. This construction does not seem in keeping with the 
language of the clause, which by its terms suggests that means be plainly adopted or appropriate to the congressional 
end, thereby requiring a closer connection than means end rationality.   See Randy E. Barnett, The Original. 
Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. PA. J. CONST . L. 1 (2003). Why is federal bribery statute well 
adapted to protect a federal interest by policing a state parks commissioner if state parks receive no federal funds?   
Most importantly for the conception of federalism defended here, such a lax approach to the Necessary and Proper 
Clause permits the federal government to impose requirements that are better addressed at the state level and should 
be subject to intergovernmental competition.  
For a strong argument that 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2) is unconstitutional, see Richard W. Garnett, The New 
Federalism, the Spending Power, and e Federal Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 39-59 (2003). 
 
112 Ilya Somin, Closing the Pandora’s Box of Federalism: The Case for Judicial Restriction of Federal Subsidies to 
State Governments, 90 Geo. L.J. 461 (2002); related arguments have been advanced by other scholars. See 
especially the work of Lynn Baker and her collaborators. Baker & Mitchell, supra note; Lynn A. Baker, Conditional 
Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911 (1995) [hereinafter Baker, Conditional Federal Spending]; 
Lynn Baker, The Revival of States’ Rights: A Progress Report and a Proposal, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 95 
(1998) [hereinafter Baker, Revival of States’ Rights]. 
. 
113 Indeed, “noncoercive” federal grants might well be a greater threat to federalism than coercive ones precisely 
because state governments are likely to use their political power to promote them. Somin, supra note. 
 
114 For a more detailed discussion, see Somin, supra note. 
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diminishes state incentives to compete.115 In addition to serving as a substitute source of state revenue, 
federal grants can sometimes undermine interstate competition more directly by enabling the states to 
establish a cartel by acceding to a common federal grant condition.116 The federal government in this 
scenario acts as the cartel manager, punishing defecting states by withdrawing their funding. For example, 
states seeking to avoid tax competition can create a cartel by the adoption of a federal policy that denies 
grants to states with tax rates below a certain level.  
 The federal government can often crush vertical competition simply by paying the states not to 
compete with it.117 Federal grants to states are a particularly effective tool for restricting competition 
because, unlike in the case of preemptive mandates, state governments are actually likely to support them 
due to their desire to acquire additional federal funds.  Finally, federal grants to state governments can 
undermine diversity by attaching conditions that force dissenting states to conform to the preferences of 
the majority. 118 Both liberal and conservative interest groups can use such conditions to impose their 
preferences on recalcitrant minority states.119 
Why might state governments be motivated to accept federal grants that undermine the key 
advantages of federalism as a system? The crude but accurate answer is that they want the money. The 
opportunity to acquire funds that are mostly paid for by taxpayers in other states is an offer that state 
governments cannot easily refuse.120  States are constantly in search of additional federal funds that 
                                                 
115For a more detailed discussion, see Somin, supra note at 468-71. See also  BRENNAN  & BUCHANAN, supra  note at 
180-84 (explaining how federal subsidies to states undermine interstate competition by creating an alternative source 
of revenue for state governments). 
 
116 Geoffrey BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, The Power to Tax 182-83 (1980).  
 
117 See Somin, supra note at 471-72. 
 
118 See, e.g., Dye, supra note; Somin, supra note; Baker, Conditional Federal Spending; Baker & Berman, supra 
note. 
 
119 For an article emphasizing the fact that this coercive power cuts both ways, see Baker & Young, supra note at 
151-61; see also Lynn A. Baker, Should Liberals Fear Federalism?, 70 U. Cin. L. Rev. 433 (2002). 
 
120 See Elizabeth Garrett, Enhancing the Political Safeguards of Federalism? The Unfunded 
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enable politicians to increase expenditures without simultaneously raising taxes for their constituents. 
Even state officials that are perfect agents of their voters might accept grants that undermine federalism as 
a system.  First, the states face, to some extent, a tragedy of the commons problem: if they pass up this 
money their citizens will still pay in federal taxes for benefits for states that do accept it. Second, the 
voters might sometimes prefer additional funds to be allowed to pursue their most preferred policy 
without restriction by the federal government. However, the problem certainly becomes more severe as a 
result of serious principal-agent problems arising from most citizens’ near-total ignorance of both the 
theory of federalism and the details of intergovernmental financial relations. 
D. Commandeering 
The Supreme Court’s decisions striking down federal “commandeering” of state government 
officers also advance the interests of structural federalism.121 In order for state governments to promote 
diversity, engage in horizontal and vertical competition, or achieve most other goals, they must have 
control over their own officials. If the federal government can commandeer these officials at will, this 
control is imperiled. To be sure, the danger to federalism is greatly reduced if the federal government 
commandeers only some subset of a state’s officials rather than all of them. Nonetheless, even modest 
forms of commandeering undermine federalism by undercutting a state’s ability to pursue its own policies 
in whatever field the commandeered officials are responsible for. 
In practice, commandeering is not nearly as great a danger to federalism as the Spending power 
and the Commerce power. State governments often have strong incentives to resist uncompensated 
commandeering because, by definition, it deprives them of resources without any offsetting benefits. For 
                                                                                                                                                             
Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1113, 1140 n.98 (1997) (pointing out that “[t]he few instances 
when states or cities decline federal grants to avoid complying with conditions are noteworthy enough to receive 
extensive press coverage”). 
 
121 The two key decisions are of course New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (invalidating portions of the 
Low-Level Radioactive Disposal Act), and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. (1997) (invalidating portions of the 
Brady Act). The scope of the anti-commandeering doctrine was limited by the Court’s decision in Reno v. Condon. 
Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 150 (2000) (holding that the Tenth Amendment constrains only such federal 
commandeering as seeks to “influence the manner in which States regulate private parties,” but does not  prevent 
Congress from regulating “state activities”). 
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this reason, state governments routinely use their political power to resist commandeering and other 
“unfunded mandates.” Uncompensated commandeering of state officials by the feds is a relatively rare 
occurrence. 122 
Nonetheless, as the Court has itself observed, circumstances may arise under which state 
governments are willing to accept commandeering. 123  Political payoffs may create incentives for state 
legislators to embrace a federal decision to order their legislation to take a particular form.  Regardless of 
whether taking action is more politically costly than doing nothing, state officials will often find the least 
costly alternative is to take the action without accepting responsibility for it. In that way the consequences 
of inaction are avoided, while the blame for the action is deflected.  
But commandeering may have other causes as well.  The substantive issue for which Congress is 
commandeering the legislature may have greater political salience than the issue of protecting state 
authority to make its own laws. State governments may be “captured” by an interest group that benefits 
from the commandeering. For instance, solving a radioactive waste problem, as in New York v. United 
States, is likely to be popular, whatever the cost to federalism. And it is likely to be supported by affected 
interests such as industries seeking to dispose of their toxic waste.   
 Even if they do not support a given commandeering policy for its own sake, some state officials 
may be willing to engage in bargaining away authority for concessions in other areas. In situations where 
there may be no legally binding compensation for the “commandeered” resources as there is in 
conditional spending cases, state governments may agree to the commandeering as part of a political deal. 
                                                 
122 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 916 (pointing out that “the historical record” reflects “not only an absence of executive-
commandeering statutes in the early Congresses, but  . . . an absence of them in our recent history as well, until 
recent years.”).  The dissent of Justice Souter disputes this conclusion, but is able to point to only a few examples of 
commandeering, most involving only minor regulatory legislation, and many commandeering judges rather than 
executive officials. Id. at 949-53 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
  
123 New York v United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182-83 (1992). 
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This is, of course, exactly what happened in the New York case, where the state of New York initially 
agreed to a legislative deal that included a commandeering provision.124 
 
E. Sovereign Immunity 
The Rehnquist Court’s sovereign immunity jurisprudence does not fit as comfortably within our 
theory as its other efforts on behalf of federalism. 125 In and of itself, allowing state governments to be 
sued by individuals for violating federal law does not undermine structural federalism - at least not if the 
law being enforced by the lawsuits does not itself run afoul of federalism principles on substantive 
grounds. As many commentators have noted, there seems to be no principled reason why the federal 
government should be allowed to enforce a given law through direct regulation, monetary incentives, and 
lawsuits initiated by federal agencies, but not through lawsuits undertaken by individuals.  The lack of a 
compelling structural rationale for state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment parallels the 
lack of strong textual support for this doctrine.126 
Professor Roderick Hills has presented a rare structural argument in favor of state sovereign 
immunity, one that relies on principal-agent theory. He claims that allowing citizen damage suits against 
state governments may empower state regulatory bureaucracies at the expense of state legislatures and 
voters.127 Private damage suits against state governments may accomplish the goals of bureaucrats whose 
interests are linked to those of national interest groups and federal government officials. And the money 
                                                 
124 Id. at 195-98 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 
125 See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (protecting state sovereign immunity against federal 
legislation allowing suits in federal courts); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (extending sovereign immunity to 
suits in state courts). 
 
126 Even the Rehnquist Court majority in favor of sovereign immunity concedes that the doctrine is not supported by 
the text of the Eleventh Amendment. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 (“the text of the Amendment would appear 
to restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts”); but see Michael A. Rappaport, 
Reconciling Textualism and Federalism: The Proper Textual Basis of the Supreme Court’s Tenth and Eleventh 
Amendment Decisions, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 819 (1999) (arguing that the textual basis for sovereign immunity can be 
found in the Constitution’s use of the word “state”). 
 
127 Roderick Hills, Jr., The Eleventh Amendment as Curb on Bureaucratic Power, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 1225 (2001). 
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paid out to claimants usually comes out of the general state budget rather than that of the specific agency 
that helped push through the liability statute in question. 128  
Hills’ argument provides, at best, very limited support for the Court’s Eleventh Amendment 
jurisprudence. It is true that state bureaucracies may support federal regulations that voters and/or state 
legislators oppose. However, it is difficult to see why federally created private rights of action against 
states pose an especially grave danger in this regard. After all, the state agency could accomplish the same 
goal simply by lobbying for a direct federal transfer of wealth to whichever interests benefit from the 
lawsuits. In addition, state elected officials have numerous ways of punishing subordinate bureaucrats 
who lobby for policies their political masters oppose.129 Certainly, the considerations raised by Hills 
cannot easily justify the current doctrine’s sweeping ban on nearly all federally created private causes of 
action against state governments. 
Assuming for a moment, however, that the Constitution does protect state sovereign immunity, 
there are reasons that state officials would not defend state sovereign immunity on occasion. First, as in 
the spending area, states may be willing to bargain away their sovereign immunity for other benefits.   
Second, some states may be already be liable for costs in a particular area because of state constitutional 
or statutory requirements and would like their competitor states to face the same costs.   
Nevertheless, one would expect state officials generally to fight against abrogations of state 
sovereign immunity more strongly than other intrusions, partly for the reasons that Hills suggests 
sovereign immunity should be protected.  It is generally not in the interest of state politicians to cede 
power over their budgets to bureaucrats or to private litigants. Thus, in providing vigorous judicial review 
for state sovereign immunity, the Court may not only be protecting a constitutional phantom, but a 
phantom that needs less judicial protection than the many more important federalism provisions actually 
contained in the Constitution.   
                                                 
128 Id. at 1234-51. 
 
129 For a summary of methods of control over public bureaucracy, see JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY (1989). 
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IV. FEDERALISM AND JUDICIAL RESTRICTION OF STATE POWER. 
 
 Our theory is broader than one that calls for judicial enforcement of state authority, because it 
also provides justification for judicial enforcement of constitutional restraints on state power. Just as state 
officials have systematic interests that cause them to act in derogation of their powers, federal officials 
have systematic interests that cause them to decline to exercise the powers that the Constitution assigns to 
them to sustain decentralized federalism, such as the power to keep open the avenues of interstate trade 
and investment. In all too many cases, state governments will have incentives to undermine federalism, 
and federal officials will have no incentive to stop them. 
 The representational structure of the federal government itself undermines the incentives of 
federal officials to protect federalism against state encroachment. In our system of federalism, each 
member of Congress is elected on a geographical basis– senators from each state and representatives from 
districts in each state.  As result, these members’ electoral fortunes are substantially influenced by the 
effect of their legislative actions on their particular constituents rather than on the nation as whole.  Thus, 
each legislator has an incentive to sustain the regulatory obstructions of his state despite the damage they 
inflict on the nation. 130  Accordingly, the representational nature of federalism can cause a geographic 
tragedy of the commons in which each representative has an incentive to negate federal power at the 
expense of the nation's economic prosperity. 131 Once again the interests of political actors–in this case the 
interests shaped by the structure of representation implicit in the Constitution itself-- militate against the 
maintenance of the Constitution’s allocation of intergovernmental authority through the political process 
alone. 
                                                 
130  See John O. McGinnis, Presidential Review as Constitutional Restoration, 51 DUKE L.J. 901, 226 (2001); 
Steven Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. (1995). One way of 
conceptualizing this problem is that geographically based special interests are built into the system of representation, 
providing parochial and protectionist legislation with additional votes. 
 
131  McGinnis, supra note x, at 226. 
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A. The Dormant Commerce Clause.  
 Parochial and protectionist legislation interferes with beneficial horizontal competition because it 
permits one state to interfere with the commerce of its competitors.  Accordingly, under the Dormant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, Congress is given the exclusive power to regulate commerce, displacing 
state power in this area.  Yet, because of capture by parochial interests described above, members of 
Congress may not take the initiative of passing legislation to get rid of  protectionist legislation.  
Accordingly, the Court enforces the Dormant Commerce Clause against the states even in the absence of 
congressional legislation. 132 Under a thoroughgoing application of the political process theory it would be 
unclear why the Court would maintain a Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence since the political 
process could be thought sufficient to police state obstruction of the free flow of goods and services. The 
same refusal to enforce the Dormant Commerce Clause could also be reached by a theory of federalism 
that focuses exclusively on “states’ rights.”  But invalidating protectionist state legislation rather than 
waiting for Congress to do the job is a recognition that federalism concerns, not the rights of states, but a 
beneficial distribution of powers for citizens. It also addresses the reality that the distribution of powers 
between the states and the federal government is not a smoothly self-enforcing mechanism. The interests 
of the political actors, state and federal, are sand in the gears of political enforcement.   
 Despite its reputation as a pro-states’ rights court, the Rehnquist Court has actually expanded 
enforcement of the Dormant Commerce Clause, providing some evidence that it is pursuing a structural 
federalism jurisprudence rather than a states rights jurisprudence. For example, it has extended the Clause 
to protect non-profit institutions that serve out-of-state customers against state discrimination. 133 
 While legislation discriminating against the import of products and services from other states is 
the paradigm case of legislation appropriately invalidated under the Dormant Commerce Clause, the 
Court has also invalidated other kinds of legislation that undermine federalism’s advantages, such as state 
                                                 
132   The Court has asserted the existence of a Dormant Commerce Clause since dicta in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 
(9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824).   
 
133 Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 584 (1997). 
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attempts to apply their laws extraterritorially to other states’ commerce.134 States that impose legal rules 
on commerce occurring within another state also undermine the virtues of federalism.  If one state’s 
commerce is regulated by another state, it is harder for a citizen to choose a state  where his preferences 
will be best satisfied, thus weakening the diversity advantages of federalism.   Regulation of in-state 
commerce by another state also impedes horizontal competition among states, as the first state has more 
difficulty in creating the climate that it believes optimal for business. Thus, the Rehnquist Court 
appropriately invalidated a statute that required wholesalers to affirm that their prices in the state are no 
higher than those charged in other states because the provisions “directly control commerce occurring 
wholly outside the boundaries of the state.”135 
 Given our structural theory, the Supreme Court has probably been wrong to allow Congress to 
give back to the states the authority to pass legislation within the domain of its exclusive interstate 
commerce authority.136 That doctrine allows the protectionist tendencies implicit in the representational 
system to frustrate the free trade zone established in the Constitution while permitting Congress and the 
states to blur accountability for which government is responsible. It is in a sense the converse of 
commandeering because it permits the states to exercise authority provided to the federal government in a 
manner that blurs lines of accountability.  This doctrine, albeit one of long standing, represents a change 
from the better rule in the Taney Court that barred Congress from delegating this authority. 137   
B. Extraterritorial Application of State Law  
    Even beyond the strictures of the Dormant Commerce Clause, a state’s extraterritorial 
application of its laws to another state undermines the advantages of federalism.  If a state applies its law 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
134 For a discussion of these cases, see Maxwell L. Stearns, A Beautiful Mend: A Game Theoretical Analysis of the 
Dormant Clause Doctrine, 45 WM & MY. L. Rev. 1, 136-142 (2004).  
 
135  See Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989). 
 
136 See In Re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1890);  Prudential Ins. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946). 
137 See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).   
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to conduct that occurs wholly outside its borders, states will have more difficulty in differentiating their 
bundle of laws from other states and citizens will find it harder to find a state that suits their preferences.  
Thus, extraterritorial application of state law can undermine both the horizontal competition and diversity 
rationales of federalism. 
Accordingly, the Court has long prohibited a state from exporting its law to punish conduct 
occurring wholly in another state,138 thus preserving the decentralizing principle that states should be 
accountable for matters that affect only their own jurisdiction.   Most recently, the Court’s punitive 
damages jurisprudence has instructed that punitive damages cannot be awarded to punish conduct that is 
lawful in the jurisdiction in which the conduct takes place.139 Whatever one thinks of the Rehnquist Court 
punitive damages cases in general, this aspect of their jurisprudence might be defended under our model 
of federalism.140 Moreover, Congress cannot necessarily be expected to police this aspect of 
decentralization itself because in-state interest groups such as trial lawyers may benefit from punitive 
damages allocated on the basis of out–of-state conduct.   
  
C. The Compact Clause. 
In another instance, however, the Rehnquist Court has been derelict in protecting federalism 
through failure to enforce the Compact Clause.141 The Court has never vigorously enforced the clause and 
                                                 
138 See, e.g.. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 824 (1975) (“A State does not acquire power or supervision over the 
internal affairs of another State merely because the welfare and health of its own citizens may be affected when they 
travel to that State”). 
139 See State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. v. Campbell, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 1522 (2003).  
140  Textually, the basis for prohibiting one state from regulating conduct in another state might be derived from the 
Dormant Commerce Clause when the conduct at issue is commercial. When the conduct is not commercial the 
prohibition on extraterritorial application of state law might be derived from the meaning of state, because states 
were traditionally immune from extraterritorial regulation of other states. See Rappaport, supra at x  (arguing that 
use of term state in the Constitution carries over the state’s traditional immunities).  
 
141 See Art I. Sec. 10 (“No State shall without the consent of Congress .. .. .enter into any Agreement or Compact 
with any State.”) 
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in 1978 formally constricted its scope by suggesting that federal consent to interstate compacts was 
necessary only when they “pose a threat to federal supremacy” on issues of “federal interest.”142  
As a matter of federalism structure, this treatment of the Clause seems a serious mistake.  Even 
without entrenching on some specific federal interest, interstate compacts create special risks that state 
officials will undermine the beneficial consequences of the structure of enumerated powers established by 
the Constitution. First, states can use the power to create cartels, preventing beneficial horizontal 
competition among them. Thus, states that produce a commodity can combine to restrict output through a 
variety of regulatory arrangements, and so raise prices.143 Such cartels obviously undermine rather than 
advance the values of competitive federalism.  Interstate compacts can impose externalities – exporting 
costs to other states that are not members of the compact.144  This kind of conduct also undermines 
horizontal competition because states can raise the costs of their competitors.  
If we could be confident that federal legislators had incentives to take the initiative to legislate 
against compacts that undermined these principles of decentralization, the Court’s decision to effectively 
relegate their policing to federal initiative would not be troubling. But the Founders’ decision to invert the 
presumption of the legality of state action in cases where states act jointly correctly reflects the political 
truth that the federal legislators cannot be trusted to take the initiative in such cases.  When many states 
are acting, it is even more likely that coalitions of members of Congress beholden to interest groups in 
those states may block legislation that would bar the compact.  
  By contrast, if the Court enforces the Clause, it is much harder for an interest group coalition to 
secure affirmative congressional consent to the Compact because of legislative inertia.145 As with state 
                                                 
142 See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 479 n.33 (1978). 
143For example, oil-producing states for many years ran a cartel that fixed oil prices, a system that amounted to a 
“domestic OPEC.” See Greve, supra note at 332. 
 
144 Id. at 325. 
145  The Constitution makes it much harder to enact legislation than to block legislation because of its tricameral 
legislative procedure—two houses and the President requires a supermajoritian consensus before legislation can be 
passed. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 TEX. L. REV. 705, 
728 (2002). 
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legislation regulating interstate commerce, we cannot trust either state officials to make compacts 
consistent with these values nor federal officials to reach out to invalidate those compacts that are 
inconsistent with them. Accordingly, the Court should enforce the Compact Clause according to its text, 
which requires congressional consent for all interstate compacts, not simply those that affect a specific 
federal interest. Alternatively, the Court should hold that federalism is itself the “federal interest” 
justifying a requirement of congressional consent in order to preserve “federal supremacy” over a vital 
matter of national concern.146  
D. THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL AND PEONAGE 
 The Supreme Court’s “right to travel” cases, which have been reaffirmed and extended by the 
Rehnquist Court, are obvious restrictions on state autonomy. 147 They prevent state governments from 
constricting the ability of their citizens to move across state lines. In the seminal case of Crandall v. 
Nevada, the Supreme Court struck down an exit tax imposed on residents leaving the state on the ground 
that “[w]e are all citizens of the United States, and as members of the same community must have the 
right to pass . . . through every part of it without interruption as freely as in our own States.”148 Modern 
decisions have extended the principle to forbid more indirect methods of restricting interstate travel.149  
 Although the right to travel cases undeniably restrict state government power, they just as clearly 
serve the needs of structural federalism. If states can prevent their citizens from leaving, they can 
undercut or even wholly eliminate interstate migration and make it harder for citizens to satisfy their 
preferences, thus undermining both the diversity and horizontal competition advantages of federalism.  In 
effect, each state would have a monopoly over its citizens.  
                                                                                                                                                             
  
146 U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 479 n.33. 
 
147  Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (striking down time -based restrictions on welfare payments to new residents 
that awarded them lower payments than those enjoyed by other "bona fide residents"). 
 
148 Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 49 (1868). 
 
149 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (striking down state laws requiring one year of residency 
prior to receipt of any welfare payments). 
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 The federalism issues addressed by the right to travel cases are even more evident in the 
“peonage” cases, which struck down state laws forcing black laborers to stay in one geographic location 
and work for the same employer.150 While the peonage laws were technically struck down under the 
Thirteenth Amendment prohibit ion of involuntary servitude,151 their invalidation can also be justified on 
structural federalism grounds similar to those applied in Crandall.  
 Obviously, there is little danger that states would today enact peonage laws or that the federal 
courts would uphold any such laws. Nonetheless, it is important to understand how these cases fit into a 
broader theory of federalism. Far from conflicting with federalism, as is sometimes thought, they reaffirm 
the freedom of movement that is among its most fundamental attributes. 
CONCLUSION. 
 
 We believe that federal and state officials have no systematic interest in protecting the powers 
distributed to them by the Constitution and indeed often have an interest in trading away or abandoning 
these powers. Because of rational ignorance, citizens themselves are often unable to monitor the failures 
of their agents, either state or federal. The lack of congruence between the constitutional distribution of 
powers and federal and state officials’ interest in enforcing them provides a justification for judicial 
enforcement. This rationale, however, is not rooted in the protection of states’ rights.   Judicial 
intervention on behalf of federalism benefits the citizens of the whole nation, not state governments, and 
can restrict as well as protect state autonomy, depending on whether restriction or protection advances the 
constitutional structure of decentralized federalism.    
                                                 
150 During the Jim Crow era, the Supreme Court played an important role in limiting state efforts to restrict African-
American mobility by striking down “peonage” laws which prevented southern blacks from leaving white 
employers. See United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914) (upholding federal anti-peonage statute); Clyatt v. 
United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905) (same); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911) (striking down Alabama 
peonage law). For a detailed discussion of the peonage cases and their historical importance, see Benno C. Schmidt, 
Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era, Part 2: The Peonage Cases, 82 
COLUM. L. REV. 646 (1982). Schmidt describes the peonage decisions as “the most lasting of the White Court's 
contributions to justice for black people.” Id. at 646. 
 
151 Bailey, 219 U.S. at 239-45. 
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 Our position immediately prompts two questions for further research. It suggests an inquiry into 
what other aspects of the structural constitution the judiciary must intervene to enforce because actors in 
the political process lack any systemic interest in protecting them.  For instance, in the area of separation 
of powers, the executive and legislature may be pleased to bargain away or cede their authority, leaving 
only the judiciary to maintain the constitutionally mandated distribution.  This theory may provide a 
justification for cases in which the Court has intervened to maintain the separation of powers and suggest 
additional areas, such as legislative delegation, in which such intervention may be necessary.  
 Second, our theory raises the question of why would the federal judiciary prove better than the 
political actors, state or federal, at protecting federalism. We do not have space to fully address that 
question here. But first and most importantly, the judiciary is unlikely to have the same kind of direct 
interest in undermining the distribution of powers that federal and state political actors often have. 152  For 
instance, the judiciary does not benefit from a federally organized cartel that insulates state officials from 
competition.  Nor does it face such focused pressure from constituents to choose a first order policy 
objective at the price of sacrificing constitutionally assigned authority. 153 
 Moreover, judges’ preferences for first order policies, unlike analogous preferences of state 
officials, may often help federalism. 154 If judges oppose a law for ideological reasons, they are more 
                                                 
152It is true that the judges are confirmed through a political process but this need not undermine their willingness to 
enforce federalism. In fact the President has a more substantial interesting in maintaining the structure of 
decentralized federalism than other political actors. His reelection and the election of the successor of his party are 
dependent on economic growth and the jurisdictional competition sustained by federalism contributes to economic 
growth. See Ray C. Fair, Economics and Presidential Elections, J. ECONS. PERSP . Summer 1996 at 89-90 
(concluding from a study of all elections since 1916 that growth of per capita output in the year of the election was 
the most important factor in determining whether incumbent party retained the presidency.) Thus, other things being 
equal, a president would be more likely to appoint nominees who are protective of federalism than federal and state 
political actors. It is also true that the Senate will have to confirm the nominees, but issues of structure will have less 
political salience than substantive issues and thus will usually not play a large role in the confirmation process.  
153 For a more extensive discussion of the comparative advantage of the judiciary in protecting federalism, at least in 
some instances, see Somin, supra note at 495-97. 
 
154 For an argument that judges views in federalism cases are shaped by their ideology, see Frank B. Cross and 
Emerson Tiller, Three Faces of Federalism: An Empirical Assessment of Supreme Court Federalism Jurisprudence , 
73 S. CAL. L. REV. 741, 763-764 (2000). 
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likely to take federalism objections against it seriously. There is some indication that this is taking place 
in the aftermath of Lopez and Morrison.   
In the Ninth Circuit alone, noted liberal judges have recently used federalism precedents to 
partially invalidate federal laws against possession of pornography155 and medical use of marijuana156 and 
a noted conservative judge used these precedents to invalidate a federal gun control law.157 While, of 
course, the other side of the coin is that ideology may inhibit some judges from applying federalist 
principles, these instances of improper judicial inaction will simply be a missed opportunity that will not 
make the distribution of federal powers worse than it would have been without judicial intervention. 158 
If judicial enforcement of federalism gains momentum, activists and judges from across the 
political spectrum will make use of the new doctrine. The recent Ninth Circuit decisions cited above are 
an example of the trend towards using federalism doctrine to protect what are usually considered left of 
center causes. In addition, some left-liberal scholars and activists are urging the use of federalism doctrine 
to protect homosexual rights (which have been more strongly supported by state and local governments 
than by Washington),159 and block federal legislation restricting abortion and assisted suicide.160 Judicial 
federalism could even help stimulate a broader political movement to restrict federal power, thus allowing 
                                                 
155 United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 
156 Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 
157 United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003) (invalidating federal gun control law as applied to 
possession of homemade machineguns). 
 
158  It may be argued, however, that judges’ ideology will lead them to overenforce federalism principles when the 
Constitution does not call for enforcement. Such false positives are, of course, theoretical possibilities but the 
question is how likely are they. After more than half a century in which the Court has failed to enforce federalism 
principles, the costs of false negatives still seem to overwhelm those of false positives. We are so far from the proper 
equilibrium of decentralizing federalism that ideology is likely to move the structure of federalism closer to that 
equilibrium in the medium and short term. 
 
159 See e.g., Stephen Clark, Progressive Federalism? A Gay Liberationist Perspective, 66 Alb. L. Rev. 719 (2003) 
(arguing that rigorous judicial enforcement of federalism promotes gay rights). 
 
160 Law, supra note at 409-17. 
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the judiciary to work in tandem with the political process rather than against it.161 The more groups 
develop a stake in judicial enforcement of federalism, the more difficult it will be to roll it back and the 
less it will be viewed solely as a narrowly “conservative” cause. 
 Second, judges, regardless of ideology, will be more motivated than elected officials, either state 
or federal, to enforce neutral principles that foster second order values like federalism. As Richard Posner 
has noted, justices have an interest in playing legal games because of the pleasure they get from the 
interplay of complex considerations and rules.162  Judges thus often put aside their political and public 
policy preferences to enforce the law according to a set of rules. Indeed, unlike state and federal officials, 
they may often positively enjoy enforcing second order values of structure at the expense of first order 
values.  Such an exaltation of second order values is a merit badge that shows that they are playing the 
constitutional law game, while their life tenure insulates them from paying the consequences of 
disregarding citizens’ first order preferences.  It will be the case that judges are more likely to play this 
game if they can see that it has a coherent purpose. By describing the essential purpose of the federalism 
game, we hope to encourage more judges to play. 
                                                 
161 See MICHAEL S. GREVE, REAL FEDERALISM (1999) (arguing that Supreme Court efforts to promote federalism 
and decentralization may attract the support of an ideologically diverse “Leave Us Alone” coalition of groups 
unhappy with federal interference in their affairs). 
 
162 See Richard Posner, What Judges Maximize (The Same Thing Everyone Else Does) , 3 SUP CT . ECON. REV. 1 
(1995).  
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